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W
HEN APARTHEID ENDED IN SOUTH AFRICA, a new
populist government, headed by Nelson Mandela,
aimed to create a more just and equal society which
would seek to address the economic and social rights
of its citizens. The 1996 Constitution guaranteed a range of rights,
including the right to health care. In addition, the government signed
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), which includes the right to health. These efforts repre-
sented a shift in government policy which would ultimately result in
enforceable legal mechanisms to ensure access to health care.
Unfortunately, slow implementation by the executive branch
delayed the realization of this new right to health. Contributions from
a variety of institutions, including the South African Human Rights
Commission, the South African Constitutional Court, the South
African Parliament and some civil society organizations, such as the
Treatment Action Campaign, pushed the executive branch to fulfill its
commitments under international and domestic law. 
In understanding this issue, it is important to examine South
Africa's response to its obligation to protect, respect, promote, and
fulfill the right to health and the role various other governmental and
non-governmental forces have played in pushing the national gov-
ernment to adhere to these responsibilities. South Africa's legal obli-
gations are defined under the ICESCR, the South African
Constitution, and several health laws passed by the legislature. These
obligations form the basis for confronting questions of access to
health care that affect everything from the availability of primary
health care to the implementation of a comprehensive HIV/AIDS
plan by the government.
DEFINING THE RIGHT TO HEALTH
ON OCTOBER 3, 1994, SOUTH AFRICA signed the ICESCR, affirm-
ing its commitment to take concrete steps to enhance access to health
care. Although it has not yet ratified the ICESCR, South Africa's
Constitutional Court must consider international law, including the
ICESCR, when making constitutional decisions. In addition, South
Africa's Human Rights Commission considers the ICESCR in defin-
ing the right to health. Though not legally binding, South Africa has
made several commitments to respect the provisions of the ICESCR.
Several articles in the ICESCR help define the right to health.
Article 12 of the ICESCR guarantees "the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health" and instructs that the provision of these rights must be pro-
gressively realized. Article 2 instructs "each State Party . . . to take
steps, individually and through international assistance and co-opera-
tion, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its avail-
able resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realiza-
tion of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropri-
ate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures." 
The duty to “progressively realize” the rights guaranteed by the
ICESCR is demanding. Progressive realization entails sustained and
continuously increasing allocation of resources towards the realization
of these rights. However, the breadth of health measures necessary to
satisfy the progressive realization standard remains ill-defined. The
drafters of the ICESCR left progressive realization intentionally vague
in order to allow individual states to determine the parameters of
socio-economic rights within the abilities of each nation. Recognizing
this ambiguity, the Limburg Principles and the Maastricht Guidelines
provide persuasive authority in defining various aspects of social and
economic rights—including the right to health—and help define pro-
gressive realization. 
THE LIMBURG PRINCIPLES (1986) AND THE MAASTRICHT
GUIDELINES (1997)
THE LIMBURG PRINCIPLES (PRINCIPLES) WERE DEVELOPED in
1986 by a group of experts in international law considering the nature
and scope of the obligations of states parties to the ICESCR. Along
with the Maastricht Guidelines (Guidelines), the Limburg Principles
are one of the benchmark standards for interpreting the ICESCR and
have been used to help interpret the right to health. They provide
insight into the measures or government actions that would achieve
progressive realization of the rights enumerated in the ICESCR. 
Specifically, paragraph 21 of the Limburg Principles states,
"The obligation to achieve progressively the full realization of the
rights' requires States parties to move as expeditiously as possible
towards the realization of the rights.” States must begin immediate-
ly to take steps to fulfill their obligations under the covenant.
Further, according to the Principles, the obligation of “progressive
realization” exists independently of increases in resources. It requires
the effective use of available resources. Thus, not only must a signa-
tory state intend to provide health care to all its citizens, but it must
also move immediately to do so even if there are limited resources in
the national coffers.
The effectiveness of the Limburg Principles was hindered by
states parties' use of  lack of resources as an excuse for not complying
with the ICESCR. The Maastricht Guidelines remedied this weakness
by refining and supplementing the Limburg Principles. The Guidelines
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mandate that "State[s] cannot use the 'progressive realization' provi-
sions in Article 2 of the Covenant as a pretext for non-compliance." 
Taken together, the Limburg Principles and Maastricht
Guidelines provide guidelines for states to use in complying with the
progressive realization standard. If a state party does not continually
take new steps to improve the general health of its citizens or fails to
effectively address major impediments to health, such as epidemics
like HIV/AIDS, it is not in compliance with its obligation under the
ICESCR. 
SOUTH AFRICA’S RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE
IN ADDITION TO ITS INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COMMITMENTS,
South Africa's 1996 Constitution guarantees a number of social and
economic rights, including the right to health. Specifically, section
27(1)(a) provides that "everyone has the right to have access to health
care services including reproductive health care . . . ." In addition, sec-
tion 27(3) states that no one can be denied emergency medical treat-
ment. Section 28(1)(c) provides for "basic health care services" for
children, while section 35(2)(e) provides for "adequate medical treat-
ment" for detainees and prisoners at the state's expense. 
While the framers of the 1996 Constitution may have intended
to incorporate all of South Africa's international legal obligations
under the ICESCR in the constitution, the plain language stops short
of the ICESCR in a few areas. The ICESCR guarantees the right to
health, including preventative measures such as the control of epi-
demics, and the right to the highest attainable standard of mental
health. By contrast, South Africa's constitution only guarantees access
to health care and mentions only the right of children to mental
health. While South Africa has yet to ratify the ICESCR, by signing
the convention it has indicated its intent to satisfy the ICESCR obli-
gations. In addition, the Constitutional Court must consider interna-
tional law, of which the ICESCR is a part, in making its decisions.
This could potentially force the government to adhere to the ICESCR
when disputes regarding economic and social rights are adjudicated by
the Court.
THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORT
The South Africa Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) is an
effective source for interpreting South Africa's obligations under the
ICESCR and its own constitution. The SAHRC was created by the
South African Constitution to "monitor and assess the observance of
economic and social rights in South Africa." It examines South
Africa's constitutional and international legal obligations by acquiring
data from the government to assess the extent of the government's
compliance with these obligations. SAHRC reports are invaluable
sources in ascertaining South Africa's legal obligations, and, by criti-
cizing or commending on the government's efforts, they effectively
encourage compliance with international and constitutional law. 
The SAHRC's 4th Annual Economic and Social Rights Report,
covering the years 2000-2002, notes that the government failed to
report key statistics regarding budgetary allocations and infant and
maternal mortality rates. The executive branch’s inability to provide
this data exhibits a lack of external accountability and a reluctance to
prioritize compliance with South Africa's constitutional obligations.
In addition, the executive branch has not shown initiative in pursuing
solutions to major health problems in South Africa in relation to the
HIV/AIDS epidemic. For example, the executive stalled efforts to
make antiretroviral drugs available until outside pressures forced them
to reconsider their position. 
THE 2003 NATIONAL HEALTH BILL
In contrast to the executive branch, the South African parliament
has been more conscious of the government's constitutional obliga-
tions and ICESCR commitments to guarantee the right of access to
health care. On November 18, 2003, the controversial National
Health Bill (Bill) was approved by the South African Parliament and
now awaits signature by President Thabo Mbeki. The Bill attempts to
regulate and create equity in the provision of health care in compliance
with the ICESCR. In an attempt to fulfill South Africa’s obligation to
provide free reproductive health, the Bill requires the South African
government to provide free health care services to "pregnant and lac-
tating women and children below the age of six years." In addition,
the Bill allows free services for termination of pregnancy. The Bill also
takes the first step towards the provision of health care for all by man-
dating free primary health care to all individuals not currently covered
by a health scheme. The Bill leaves defining primary health care to the
minister of health. Primary health care would likely include the provi-
sion for basic health needs and address the socio-economic causes of
poor health. The Bill also creates national and provincial advisory
boards that would focus on creating equity in a system characterized
by a disparate distribution of resources. 
Some critics of the Bill argue that it will prove too costly and will
interfere with market forces by forcing doctors into rural areas that
cannot or will not pay for medical services. An explanatory memoran-
dum attached to the Bill points out the potential need for an increase
in funding sources, especially for the provision of free primary health
care. In addition, health care providers dislike the Bill because it cen-
tralizes the certification of all physicians and gives the minister of
health discretion in determining where health care resources are need-
ed and, consequently, where doctors should be authorized to practice.
In effect, this would force many doctors to practice in rural areas. But
assuming the government allocates the necessary funds, the law would
be a major step towards progressively realizing the constitutional right
to health care in South Africa by taking steps to guarantee individual
access to health care services. 
“. . . the executive branch has not shown initiative in pursuing 
solutions to major health problems in South Africa in relation 
to the HIV/AIDS epidemic.”
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The most effective institution in holding the executive branch to
their obligations has been the Constitutional Court (Court) of South
Africa. The Court, which is the highest court for all constitutional
matters in the country, is required to consider international law under
section 39 of the South African Bill of Rights, and can consider the
law of other democratic countries in making its decisions. The Court
has construed its role as "to require the state to take measures to meet
its constitutional obligations and to subject the reasonableness of these
measures to evaluation." 
The Court clarified the constitutional requirements of the
right to health in several landmark cases. In Soobramoney v. Minister of
Health, the Court ruled that the citizenry's constitutional right of
equal access to healthcare must be balanced with a governmental need
to prioritize the allocation. Soobramoney involved a renal patient who
was refused regular kidney dialysis at a government health clinic
because of the government-instituted system of priorities. The Court
held that the minister of health was justified in instituting a program
of prioritization where renal patients with the potential to be cured
received kidney dialysis before renal patients who merely had the
potential of prolonged life. Further, the Court held that because Mr.
Soobramoney was ineligible for kidney transplant due to heart disease
and other limiting factors, the government was justified in providing
dialysis treatment to individuals with fewer complications. Although
the Court allowed the minister of health discretion in the allocation of
resources, it required a standardized priority system and reaffirmed the
principle of progressive realization.
A later case, Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign,
rejected the UN concept of “minimum core” rights. The UN
Committee on Economic and Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)
prepares General Comments on specific key articles of the ICESCR to
assist states in clarifying the duties the ICESCR imposes on the state.
The CESCR developed the concept of “minimum core” rights to
ensure that essential levels of ICESCR rights, such as access to food-
stuffs and primary health care, were prioritized by governments and
implemented immediately. According to the Maastricht Guidelines,
the minimum core rights apply irrespective of the availability of
resources of the country concerned or any other factors and difficulties.
In Treatment Action Campaign, the Court rejected the CESCR’s
defined standard of minimum core rights. The Court ruled that it was
impossible to give everyone access even to a "core" service immediate-
ly, stating, "All that is possible, and all that can be expected of the
state, is that it act reasonably to provide access to the socio-economic
rights identified in Sections 26 [Right to Housing] and 27 [Rights to
Health Care, Food, Water and Social Security] on a progressive basis."
ANTIRETROVIRALS—ONE MORE STEP
Despite its refusal to recognize the CESCR concept of minimum
core rights, the Court ordered the government to provide HIV/AIDS
preventative measures to all pregnant women. In Treatment Action
Campaign, the Court applied a balancing test to determine whether
measures taken by the government with respect to the prevention of
mother-to-child transmission of HIV was reasonable. 
Despite a number of factors proving to the contrary, the govern-
ment argued that distribution and transportation costs were not cov-
ered and would be substantial and that the drug in question
(Nevirapine) was not shown to be safe and effective. Several points
belie the government's argument. First, a joint US/Ugandan study
showed an 80-90% reduction of mother-to-child infection if a single
dose of Nevirapine is administered to the mother before childbirth,
and it has not been shown to cause serious side effects. Second, a
pharmaceutical group agreed to provide Nevirapine free of charge to
the South African government. Finally, in 1996, the US Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) approved Nevirapine for use by HIV
positive pregnant women. Despite all of these factors, the minister of
health determined that a pilot program consisting of a small group was
necessary before the government could allow distribution of
Nevirapine to all HIV positive pregnant women. 
The government’s decision denied all HIV-positive South
African women access to the drug—except the few women implicated
in the pilot program. Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), a South
African NGO whose main objective is to campaign for greater access
to HIV/AIDS treatment for South Africans by raising public aware-
ness about HIV treat-
ments, filed suit.











that the pilot pro-
gram was necessary to
ensure that the drug was
safe and to prevent viral resistance to the drug. The government also
argued that the services necessary to comprise a full treatment (i.e.,
provision of baby formula and counseling) were unavailable because
the government did not have the financial resources to provide them.
Considering the FDA had approved the drug for use after clinical tri-
als and the fact that the drug was to be given free to the government,
the government's arguments were not well received. Accordingly, the
Court ruled that the need to immediately implement a program to
prevent any further mother-to-child HIV transmission was com-
pelling and rejected each of the government's arguments. As a result,
the Ministry of Health is currently expediting its distribution of the
Nevirapine anti-retroviral in compliance with the Court's ruling.
In these cases, the Constitutional Court compelled the execu-
tive branch to act in compliance with a constitutional right to health
care and the government largely complied. By requiring the govern-
ment to implement the Nevirapine distribution program, the
Constitutional Court put the executive on notice that it was the gov-
ernment's responsibility to distribute drugs to fight HIV/AIDS.
Given the result of Treatment Action Campaign, the executive could
expect a similar ruling if a case involving a general rollout of anti-
retrovirals to all sufferers of full-blown AIDS were brought before
the Court. This type of pressure undoubtedly had an effect upon the
executive's decision-making process, as a general antiretroviral pro-
gram is now being considered.
CHANGES IN SOUTH AFRICA’S HEALTH POLICY
Despite the fact that South Africa has one of the highest HIV
prevalence rates in the world with an estimated 4.7 million people liv-
ing with HIV/AIDS, the executive branch has been reluctant to pro-
vide drugs to combat HIV/AIDS. Until recently, President Mbeki and
Nelson Mandela meeting with TAC, a
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other executive branch officials, including Minister of Health Manto
Tshabalala-Msimang, had refused to distribute antiretrovirals to treat
those already living with HIV/AIDS, citing concerns about the toxic-
ity of the drugs. 
Recent events indicate a surprising change in government policy.
President Mbeki's cabinet assigned a committee to investigate treat-
ment options for HIV/AIDS and, on November 13, 2003, Finance
Minister Trevor Manuel announced a three year R12 billion (US$1.2
billion) program to fight HIV/AIDS, including R1.9 billion (US$284
million) marked specifically for antiretroviral treatment and the pur-
chase of medicines. With this progressive move, the national govern-
ment has finally acknowledged that the new government’s AIDS pol-
icy is "based upon the premise that HIV causes AIDS."
The government's recent response to HIV/AIDS indicates a new
willingness to fulfill its constitutional obligations and international
legal commitments. The “Summary Report of the Joint Health and
Treasury Task Team Charged with Examining Treatment Options to
Supplement Comprehensive Care for HIV/AIDS in the Public Health
Sector” (Task Team Report) signals a profound shift in government
policy. In the report, the government recognizes that HIV causes
AIDS and proposes a very
expensive program to provide
antiretrovirals to sufferers of
full-blown AIDS. The anti-
retroviral distribution prom-
ises to treat at least 1.2 mil-
lion persons living with AIDS
by 2005 by allocating pro-
gressively increasing funds (a
lower estimate of 200,000
people is given by TAC).
Until now, the government
has concentrated its efforts on
the dissemination of preven-
tion messages. Only limited
antiretroviral treatment has
been available to HIV-posi-
tive South Africans due to its
prohibitive cost. 
The reason for the gov-
ernment's sudden change in
health policy is not entirely
clear. One possibility is that
pressure from governmental and non-governmental forces has success-
fully pushed the executive branch to reverse its original position. In
addition to the Constitutional Court’s demonstrated willingness to
challenge the executive's decisions in this area, the SAHRC pushed the
government in its report by saying, "A National Action Plan for the
universal access to ARVs should be the government's top priority and
it is highly recommended that the National Budget reflect this." Other
efforts to make antiretrovirals available include a suit brought in South
Africa by Treatment Action Campaign to challenge GlaxoSmithKline
and Boehringer Ingelheim for excessive pricing of their antiretroviral
medicines and securities violations. 
Another possibility is that new sources of outside funding have
convinced the executive branch that implementing a widespread ARV
program is economically feasible and will not strip other areas of the
government's budget—health and otherwise. The Clinton
Foundation, an organization founded by former US President Bill
Clinton to assist the world's poor and to battle HIV/AIDS, recently
brokered an agreement with four generic pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers to provide ARVs to certain countries, including South Africa, for a
greatly reduced price. Of course, this assumes that the executive
branch did not actually believe "denialist” claims that HIV did not
cause AIDS and that the only obstacle to ARV rollout was economic.
The idea that a government would ignore its constitutional obliga-
tions until outside funding became available is at least troubling. 
In the end, the change in policy was probably a combination of
outside pressure and funding for a broad distribution initiative.
Governmental and non-governmental pressures coupled with
increased economic feasibility pushed the executive branch to change
its position and to start to address the AIDS epidemic.
CONCLUSION
GIVEN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH HISTORY, ITS RECENT MOVES to
rollout a national antiretroviral program are surprising and encourag-
ing. Now, the South African executive branch has the opportunity to
satisfy its international commitments and constitutional obligations
by fighting the scourge of AIDS and offering treatment options.
Several steps would be consistent with this new policy. 
First, the executive could
ensure that the first year’s alloca-
tion for the antiretroviral rollout
is completed. Even if the current
plan of making antiretrovirals
available to the 400,000-500,000
sufferers of full-blown AIDS is
realized, over 4 million HIV-pos-
itive South Africans will remain
with little or no treatment
options. The proposal outlined
in the Task Team Report should
be followed and increased fund-
ing should be allocated each year
to satisfy the progressive realiza-
tion component of the ICESCR
and the South African
Constitution. If prevention
efforts remain strong and the
government continues to allocate
increasing amounts of resources
for treatment, a majority of
South Africans sick with
HIV/AIDS could eventually have treatment options.
Second, and more generally, the executive branch could recon-
sider its constitutional obligations under sections 26 and 27 of the
constitution. The role of the executive branch is not merely to assure
fiscal restraint and follow the lead of other governmental and non-gov-
ernmental institutions. It could take initiative to assure compliance
with constitutional and international legal obligations concerning the
right to health. 
Third, the executive branch could cooperate with the SAHRC by
instructing the Department of Health to produce statistics and by
adhering to SAHRC recommendations. 
Finally, the executive could provide substantial resources and
leadership in implementing legislative measures, such as the new
National Health Bill, that address and attempt to fulfill the right to
health care. By signing the Bill, President Mbeki would send a strong
signal that the executive is taking concrete steps to the realization of a
right to health care in South Africa.  HRB
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“Despite the fact that South
Africa has one of the highest HIV
prevalence rates in the world with
an estimated 4.7 million people
living with HIV/AIDS, the
executive branch has been
reluctant to provide drugs to
combat HIV/AIDS.” 
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